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"My keenest interest is excited, not by what are called great questions
and great cases, but by little decisions which the common run of selectors
would pass by because they did not deal with the Constitution, or a telephone cu.pany, yet which have in them the germ of some wider theory,
and therefore of some profound interstitial change in the very tissue of
the law."-Mr. Justice Holmes, Collected Legal Essays, p. 269.

NOTES ON RECENT MISSOURI
CASES
ROBBERY-ANIMUS FURANDI-FORCIBLE COLLECTION
OF DEBT. State v. Culpepper.'
Wallace Culpepper was convicted of robbing Frank McGrath. Both
were real estate agents in the town in which they lived. In addition, Culpepper was city marshal. As agents they had some joint operations.
Culpepper claimed that McGrath was his aebtor in the sum of one hundred
and seventy-five dollars by virtue of two real estate transactions.
McGrath testified that Culpepper called him into his (Culpepper's)
house and by threats of death compelled McGrath to draw a cheque for
one hundred and seventy-five dollars. McGrath did this and Culpepper
indorsed the cheque and apparently sent his wife to a bank where the
cheque was cashed. Upon her return McGrath was permitted to leave
the house.
The Supreme Court of Missouri ruled that if Culpepper acted in
good faith in compelling the payment of what he supposed was a valid
obligation he could not be guilty of robbery because of the absence of
animus furandi. The court followed an earlier decision in State v. Brown'
1.

(1922)

238 S. W.

801.

See

note

in 13 A. L. R. 139, 147.
2.
(1891) 104 Mo. 365, 16 S. W. 406.

(35)

See dictum in State v. Carroll
160 Mo. 368, 60 S. W. 1087.

(1901)
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which finds support in a number of4 decisions.' However, there are a
number of decisions to the contrary.
The point of view of the latter decisions is best expressed in Fannin
v. State :'

..... but
.. no man has a right, as we understand the law,
to take the law in his own hands, and at the point of a six shooter,
putting his debtor in fear of his life or serious bodily injury, collect
a debt, however just, and then defend against it on the ground that the
property was not fraudulently taken because appellant owed him the
money and would not pay him. This is more than a simple trespass,
and it will be a dangerous doctrine to hold that a man can thus collect his debts."
The debate resolves itself into the proper definition of the term
animus furandi. To state that this requires a felonious intent makes no
advance and misleads. The term felony, properly used, has no meaning
except by way of classifying crimes. To state that animus furandi requires a fraudulent purpose is better but still unsatisfactory, for the term
fraud is as vague as any legal term.
A good discussion of the term appears in Pollock and Wright's
Possession in the Common Law.' It is there stated that animus furandi
embodies two notions: (1) an intention of deprival and appropriation
(2) in the defiance of the will of the owner.
If this is correct then it would follow that the collection of a debt
against the will of the debtor with the intention of permanently appropriating the thing taken is at least larceny.
There should be no difficulty in distinguishing the above problem
3. State v. Hollyway (1875) 41 Iowa
200; Crawford v. State (1893) 90 Georgia
701, 17 S. W. 628, 35 Am. St. R. 242;
Johnson v. State (1883) 73 Ala. 523
(larceny); Wolf v. State (1883) 14 Tex.
App. 210 (larceny); Barton v. State
(1921) 227 S. W. 317, 13 A, L. R. 147;
Regina v. Hemmings (1864) 4 F. & F.
50; Young v. State (1896) 37 Tex. Cr.
Rep. 457 (larceny-the decision may be
justified on theory that there was no defiance of the will of the owner); State v.
Reilly (1877) 4 Mo. App. 392 (embezzlement-semble); Regina v. Bodan (1844)
1 C. & K. 395.
Bishop, Criminal Law,
8th ed., favors the doctrine of the above
cases-see. 849, vol. II. Wharton, Crim.
inal Law, l1th ed., sec. 1122 is not decisive.
4. Commonwealth v. Stebbins (1857)

74 Mass. 492 (opinion unsatisfactoryseems to draw distinction between taking
with honest claim to specific money and
honest claim to any money to apply on
debt.) Gettinger v. State (1882) 13 Nebraska 308, 312, 14 N. W. 403 (larceny);
McKenzie v. State (1910) 8 Ga. App.
124, 68 S. W. 622 (memorandum opinion); People v. Solomon (1896) 42 N. Y.
Supp. 573 (dictum); Fannin v. State
(1907) 51 Tex. Cr. 41, 100 S. W. 916,
10 L. R. A. (n. s.) 745, 123 Am. St. R.
874 (disapproved in Barton v. State
(1921) 227 S. W. 317); Butler v. State
(1878) 3 Tex. App. 403. See note in 13
A. L. R. 151.
5. See note 4, supra.
6. Page 223 ff. The author does not
seem to have considered Regina v. Hem.
mings, note 3, supra.
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from the accepted doctrine' that one is not guilty of larceny or cognate
crime if he takes a specific thing under a claim of right to that
specific thing. Naturally, one does not have the actual intent in such a
case to defy the will of the owner. He believes that he himself is the
owner.
In the final event, however, the correct solution of the problem probably cannot be determined through logical processes alone. What is socially expedient? That must be the ultimate test of any rule of criminal
law. Is it desirable to announce that it is no crime if one without violence
or putting in fear obtains property of another without consent and with
intent to deprive merely because that is his way of obtaining what is due
him? Is it desirable to have it known that if a man is strong enough or
violent enough he may enter judgment for his claim and proceed to execute his judgment and not be guilty of robbery? Why should a premium
be placed upon violence and mere strength?
The rule announced in the Missouri cases and probably in the majority of decisions seems io the writer to be the negation of justice obtained by orderly processes."
G. E. W.

MISFEASANCE AND NONFEASANCE-DUTY
PERSONS. Hamm v. C. B. & Q. R. Co. et alV

TO THIRD

Roy Hamm, while driving an auto truck, was struck by a train at a
crossing. He sued the railroad company, Millard F. Hughes (the engineer
of the train), and others. He obtained judgment against the defendants.
On appeal the Kansas City Court of Appeals reversed the judgment as to
Hughes.
In Stuart v. Standard Oil Co.' the plaintiff was injured while attempting to "shimmer out" of a steel condenser box. The working foreman,
Charles Hawkins, was also a defendant. The jury returned a verdict
against the corporation defendant but in favor of defendant Hawkins.
The Kansas City Court of Appeals denied that the verdict was "contra7.

State v.

Williams (1888)

95 Mo.

8.

The conduct herein discussed does

247, 8 S. W. 217; Browns v. State (1873)
28 Ark. 126; Glenn v. State (1906) 49
Tex. Cr. Rep. 349, 92 S.W. 806; People
v. Hughes (1895) 11 Utah 100, 39 Pac.
See citations in Barton v. State
492.
(1921) 227 S. W. 317. The distinction

not seem to come under the notion of extortion at common law; but some statutes
have given a broader meaning to that
crime. See State v. Coleman (1906) 99
Minn. 487, 110 N. W. 5, 116 Am. State
Rep. 441 (note), R. S. Mo. 1919, secs.

is made in Fannin v. State (1907) 51
Tex. Cr. 41, 100 S. W. 916, 123 Am. St.

3309, 3311, 3492.

Rep. 874.
Rep. 486.

See a note in 135 Am. St.

1. (1922) 245 S. W. 1109.
2. (1922) 244 S. W. 970.
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dictory and self-destructive" and. affirmed the judgment upon the verdict
rendered.
In the Haom case apparently the only negligence charged against the
engineer was his failure to ring the bell or give other warning. There
was sufficient evidence of this failure but the court held that this neglect
was only nonfeasance and that Hughes was not responsible to Hamm for
that.
In the Stuart case the allegations were that Hawkins (1) ordered
plaintiff to "shimmer out" of the condenser box, and (2) refused to
furnish the plaintiff a ladder with which he might get out of the box.
The case was submitted to the jury as against the defendant company on
the second allegation only. As to Hawkins the trial court apparently
thought that he was not responsible under the second allegation even if
it were true. Anyway, the jury was directed to consider whether Hawkins
ordered plaintiff to "shimmer out" and was told that if he did not give
such an order then the verdict should be in his favor. In other words,
the trial court apparently proceeded upon the alleged distinction between
nonfeasance (for which Hawkins would not and the company would be
responsible to plaintiff) and misfeasance (for which both would be responsible to plaintiff).
The nonfeasance test of a servant's liability is vague, and is also
misleading unless it be applied with some discrimination as to the sort
of duty which the servant has omitted to perform in the particular case.
Nonfeasance is defined by Bouvier as "the non-performance of an
act that ought to be done". It is not an absolute term but relates to some
duty not performed. In the case of a master and servant relationship
there are three classes of duties to regard. First, the servant is under
duties to his master growing out of their contract and relationship. Second, the master is under duties to third persons. He is under the usual
duty incumbent upon those who act, or have actions done in their behalf,
to refrain from injuring others. In addition to this he may be under
some peculiar duty to a third person arising from contract or occupation.
Third, the servant is under duties to third persons. As a member of
society he is bound to respect the rights of his fellow beings. These
duties are not added to or subtracted from by his situation as a servant.
The nonfeasance by a servant of a duty which falls in the first or
second of the above classes does not ipso facto make him liable to a
third person. That should be obvious from the nature of the duty
neglected. As will be pointed out later the dicta which gave rise to our
nonfeasance test were uttered with reference to these classes of duties.
If the test had not been misunderstood it would have been harmless and
perhaps helpful. The harm came when the test was without discrimination applied td the third class of duties mentioned above, viz, those which
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the servant owed to third persons. There is no reason for absolving a
servant from his usual duties to fellow beings; nor should there be any
occasion to speculate as to whether his breach of those duties constitutes
mis-, mal-, or nonfeasance.
The doctrine that a servant is not liable for nonfeasance harks back
to dicta uttered by Chief Justice Holt and a bit of argument by Lord
Coke.
A proper respect paid to the memory of these great jurists requires
us to note that they never meant to deny that a servant is under the same
duties that rest upon other members of society. In Lane v. Cotton' the
action was against the postmaster general to recover the value of exchequer bills contained ina letter delivered to one Breese, a clerk in the
post-office, which letter was lost from the post-office.
There was no
claim that Breese was remiss in any way. The postmaster general was
held not liable. Holt, C. J., in the course of a dissenting opinion uttered
the following dicta:
"It was objected at the Bar, that they have this remedy against
Breese. I agree, if they could prove that he took out the bills, they
might sue him for it; so they might anybody else on whom they could
fix that fact; but for a neglect in him they can have no remedy
against him; for they must consider him only as a servant; and then
his neglect is only chargeable on his master, or principal; for a servant
or deputy, quatenus such, cannot be charged for neglect, but the
principal only shall be charged for it; but for a misfeasance an action
will lie against a servant or deputy, but not quatenus a deputy or
servant, but as a wrong-doer."
It should be borne in mind that the duty involved in the case, and
the one that the Chief Justice must have had in mind when he uttered
these dicta, was the duty to guard and forward the letter. He was of
the opinion that such a duty rested upon the postmaster general but was
overruled as to this. Much less did any such duty rest upon Breese who
was merely a servant. No such duty rested upon him as a member of
society and he was in no relation with the plaintiff that would create such
duty. Holt did not mean that a servant is not,,liable for neglect of duties
that rest upon him. He meant merely that the servant is not liable for
neglecting some one's else duties.
In Marsh v. Astrey4 the action was against an under-sheriff for not
returning a writ and by this omission injuring plaintiff. Lord Coke
argued for the defendant "that this action being for nonfeasance, i. e., for
not returning the writ, the action lieth not against the under-sheriff, but
ought to be brought against the sheriff himself; for he is responsible for
3. (1701) 12 Mod. 472.
Col. L. R. 116.

See also 3

4.

(1588)

1 Leonard 146.
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all things concerning the office". Lord Coke was simply arguing that
neglect of the sheriff's duties would not ipso facto make the under-sheriff
liable. The facts in the case, however, showed that the under-sheriff was
himself remiss. He received the writ, accepted pay in advance for executing it, and then deceitfully failed to return the writ. The court held
him liable and thus the case is clear authority that a servant is liable
for nonfeasance of his duties. It seems that this bit of argument uttered
by the great Lord Coke has had greater currency and influence than the
actual decision. Moreover, Lord Coke did not argue that a servant is not
liable for neglecting his own duties.

Story says that the agent "is not in general (for there are exceptions)
liable to third persons for his own nonfeasance or omissions of duty in

the course of his employment".'

If Story meant by nonfeasance duties

owed by the servant to his master or those owed by his master to the
third person his statement is rational. But his statement has been given
a larger meaning and one that is not rational." It has been construed to
mean that a servant may neglect his own duties with impunity.
The servant's status as such should have but little bearing on the
question of his liability. His employment merely explains how he happens to be engaged in the acts complained of. In the Hamm case, Hughes'
employment is a plausible reason for his driving the locomotive along the
track, but is not a reason for increasing or decreasing his duty to be
careful. If Hughes had owned the railroad and locomotive he would
doubtless have been held liable under the circumstances of the injury; and
there would have been no speculation as to whether omitting to ring the
bell was ncnfeasance. It is not ownership of apparatus, however, that
creates the duty to exercise care in using it. Anyone driving a locomotive
ought to do so carefully. He ought to ring the bell when he approaches
a crossing, whether he happens to be driving as an owner, trespasser,
licensee, or servant. This is his personal duty running directly to persons
who are endangered by his driving.
While it is not possible to reconcile all the opinions which have been
rendered on the responsibility of an agent or servant to others than his
principal or master yet some general tendencies have been noticed.
The formula is that "an agent is personally responsible to third parties for doing something which he ought not to have done, but not for
not doing something which he ought to have done, the agent, in the
latter case, being liable to his principal only".'
It is obvious, of course, that this solvent may be applied in a very
5. Story on Agency, 9th ed. sec.308.
6. See Mechem, Agency, 2nd ed.,
secs. 1466 ff. See May v. Chicago B. &
Q. R. Co. (1920) 225 S. W. 660, 1. c. 665,

where Goode, J.,writes of it as a "decried doctrine".
7. Delaney v. Rocherean (1882) 34
La. Ann. 1123, 44 Am. Rep. 456.
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rigid way. One may look narrowly at the particular thing and if that
particular thing is the failure to take some action it is possible to apply
the magic formula and hold the servant or agent without responsibility
to a third person. Such is the treatment given the facts in the recent
opinions of the Kansas City Court of Appeals. In one case the engineer
failed to ring a bell.
This fact was detached from the other facts in
the case. Undoubtedly, the one fact was a nonfeasance. The formula
was applied to that and the result was no liability on the part of the
engineer to the person injured. In the other case, the same analysis was
made apparently by the trial court and this was approved on appeal.
Another point of view refuses to look so narrowly at a particular fact
but rather looks at all the facts and with a broad vision determines
whether a person was acting or was merely in a state of non-action. Mr.
Mechem' has expressed this point of view thus: "It would seem to need
no argument to show that the mere not-doing of a particular act which is
in itself but a mere incident in the larger act of doing, ought not to be
regarded such a nonfeasance as will excuse the agent within any proper
meaning of that term."
There is a third point of view that is as arbitrary as the first but
leading to a different result in many cases. It was first stated, apparently,
by Gray, C. J., in Osborne v. Morgan :' "It is often said in the books that
an agent is responsible to third persons for misfeasance only and not for
nonfeasance, and it is doubtless true that if an agent never does anything
toward carrying out his contract with his principal but wholly omits or
neglects to do so, the principal is the only person who can maintain any
action against him for the nonfeasance. But if the agent once actually
undertakes and enters upon the execution of a particular work, it is his
duty to use reasonable care in the manner of executing it so as not to
cause any injury to third persons which may be the natural consequence
of his acts; and he cannot, by abandoning its execution midway and
leaving things in a dangerous condition, exempt himself from liability to
any person who suffers injury by reason of his having so left them without
proper safeguards. This is not nonfeasance or doing nothing, but it is
misfeasance, doing improperly." Emphasis is here laid upon the time of
the happening of an act and not upon the quality or character of that
act.
A review of the Missouri decisions fails to disclose that any theory
has been followed consistently.
In Harriman et al. v. Stowe"5 the plaintiff alleged that she was injured
by falling through a hatchway constructed by defendant and by him
8. Mechem, Agency, 2nd ed., sec.
1474.
Mr. Mechem admitted that not
all of 'the cases were in harmony with
the quoted statement.

9. (1881)
Rep. 437. See
ed.. secs. 1471
10. (1874)

130 Mass. 102, 39 Am.
also Mechem, Agency, 2nd
ff.
57 Mo. 93.

42 '
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"left insecure and unprotected". This would appear to be an allegation
of nonfeasance, if there is anything in the term. It was admitted that the
house wherein the hatchway was built belonged to the wife of defendant.
Defendant alleged that he built the hatchway as agent for his wife. The
evidence was not satisfactorily set forth but the trial court instructed the
jury that in order to find for plaintiff they must find that defendant
negligently constructed the hatchway "or so left it". This instruction
would seem to make defendant liable for either misfeasance or nonfeasance. Finally, the court stated that it appeared as if defendant was
not an agent but was acting for himself. So, the decision contains at
most only an abstract statement of the dicta of Lord Holt as perpetuated
by Story.'
In Lottman v. Barnett' the plaintiff sued for the death of her husband who was killed in the collapse of a building which was being raised.
The defendant was the superintending architect and the jury evidently
found that he gave negligent directions for raising the building or else
that he knew or should have known that a certain column (which he had
constructed) was of defective construction. In either event he was held
liable. In no event, moreover, did the court think that the doctrine concerning nonfeasance was applicable to him.
The plaintiff's petition in Steinhauser v. Spraul" alleged that the defendant was the agent of her husband. Over two years before the injury
defendant had hired plaintiff as a domestic servant and had exercised
control over her. On the particular occasion plaintiff, at direction of
defendant, made use of a ladder to enter a pigeon house. The ladder was
too long and plaintiff fell. The court was of the opinion that plaintiff
had stated a good cause of action because defendant's conduct was misfeasance. It also thought that the facts would justify a jury in finding
that defendant was a principal and liable for her conduct as such.
On a second appeal of this case" there was a divided court, a majority
holding that judgment for plaintiff should be reversed, and her petition
dismissed. Those constituting the majority did not entirely agree in their
reasons. Sherwood and Robinson, JJ., in an opinion by Sherwood, J.,
apparently thought (.1) that the defendant owed no duty to furnish a
ladder of proper length, and (2) that her direction to use the ladder was
not equivalent to a physical act and was of no consequence for that
reason. It would seem that it may be conceded that defendant (being a
11.

In Lottman v. Barnett (1876)

62

Mo. 1.c. 168 it is stated: "Negligence in
leaving open a trap door was not considered nonfeasance by this court in Har.

caused by

Compare

13.

127 Mo. I. c. 555, where Sherwood, j.,
seemed to think that the damage was

515.
14.

riman v. Stone (57 Mo. 93)."

"defectively

constructing the

trap door".
(1893)

114 Mo. 551,

21 S. W.

(1895) 127 Mo. 541, 28 S. W. 620.
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wife) had no duty to furnish a ladder. However, plaintiff was seeking
to recover because plaintiff was directed by defendant to use an unsuitable
ladder. The second point suggested by Sherwood, J., seems novel and
doubtful. 5 In his opinion Sherwood, J., also justified his conclusion upon
the basis of assumption of risk and this was apparently agreed to by all
constituting the majority of the court. Brace, C. J., Gantt, and Burgess,
JJ., dissented without opinion. No doubt they agreed with the opinion
that had been rendered by Burgess, J., on the former appeal but apparently
repudiated by Sherwood and Robinson, JJ. The opinion by Sherwood, J.,
is interesting because it reviews many of the well known cases dealing
with nonfeasance and misfeasance and for the apparent attempt to twist
what was held to be misfeasance (on the first appeal) to nonfeasance.
The cases cited in the opinion well illustrate how' unreal is the orthodox
rule."
McGinnis v. C. R. I. & P. Ry. Co." is an interesting decision. Plaintiff
sued the company, Welsh, and French. The latter two were fellow servants with plaintiff. The trial court eliminated Welsh. The jury gave a
verdict against the company and in favor of French. The injury occurred
while the persons mentioned were engaged in loading a tool car. The
object was to place a rubble car on top of some timber and turn it over
on its back. In doing so they lifted it on its edge. Then (according to
plaintiff) French gave the car a shove and stood back. This caused
plaintiff to fall to the ground. Graves, J., after stating the orthodox
doctrine concerning nonfeasance and misfeasance, declared: "We have
quoted at length from the evidence for the reason that in the brief,
counsel for plaintiff undertakes to argue that the act of French in lifting
and pushing the rubble car in the way he did was misfeasance, but, his
act in failing to assist in letting down the car was nonfeasance. This
will not do. The thing to be done was to turn over a rubble car. French
participated in that work and if he was guilty of negligence in doing the
work, it was misfeasance."
The writer agrees with Graves, J., that it is not desirable to attempt
to refine a job into its elements as was suggetsed. In the words of Mr.
Mechem, the failure of French to assist in letting down the car was "a
mere incident in the larger act of doing". But it would seem that the
Kansas City Court of Appeals did refine in this very way when it de15. See Mechem, Agency, 2nd ed.,
neglects by agents as to their personal
sec. 1477, n. 34 where this decision is
liability therefor, may seem nice and
said to be one "in which the doctrine of
artificial, and partakes, perhaps, not a litnon-liability for alleged nonfeasance is
tie of the subtility and over-refinement
carried to the extreme."
of the old doctrines, of the common law."
16. Even Story recognized this: "The ............
Story on Agency, 9th ed.,
distinction, thus propounded, between
sec. 309.
misfeasance and nonfeasance, between
17. (1906) 200 Mo. 347, 98 S. W.
acts of direct, positive wrong and mere
590.

LAW SERIES BULLETIN

28

clared that the failure of an engineer to ring a bell (being only one of
many things connected with driving an engine) was nonfeasance for
which he was not responsible to a third person."
Orcutt v. Century Building Co." presents a difficulty in that the facts
are not sufficiently set out to make it clear what was the cause of the
injury. The Mississippi Valley Trust Company was agent for the Century
Company in operating an office building. Plaintiff was a passenger in
an elevator which fell. The cause of falling is not clear. The Mississippi
Valley Trust Company argued that it was not liable to plaintiff for nonperformance of the duties to its principal. The argument was denied
and it was held by Graves, J.: "When it undertook the management of this
building from its principal, it undertook to do for the principal a particular
work, and after it entered upon the performance of that work, any act
which it did, whether by omission or commission, was misfeasance. After
making this contract, had it stood aloof and refused to take the management of the building, and in so doing, thereby failed to do something
which resulted in injury to a third person, it would not have been liable,
because we would thus have mere nonf~asance."
This language is a devolepment of the viewpoint expressed by
Graves, J., in the McGinnis case, supra. Indeed it is an adherence to the
third point of view set forth in the first part of this note, viz., the rule of
Gray, C. J., in Osborne v. Morgan.'" This is different from the reasoning
in the previous Missouri cases and the two recent rulings of the Kansas
City Court of Appeals seem to conflict with it.
For the purpose of this note the ruling in Jewell v. Bolt and Nut Co.'
is that when one Sturges ordered plaintiff "to perform his duties as
catcher or quit his job" despite the existence of a peril it was "a positive
wrong or misfeasance on the part of Sturges" for which he would be liable
to plaintiff even though he was only an employe of the defendant company.'
John O'Neil was injured by the fall of an elevator and he sued the
C. V. Young and Sons' Seed and Plant Company and John Young. One
question was whether John Young (the president and manager of the
corporation) was liable individually. Two of three judges held that he
18. The reference is to Hamm v. C. B.
& Q. R. Co. et al. (1922) 245 S. W. 1109.
Compare Southern Ry. Co. v. Griazle
(1906) 124 Ga. 735, 53 S. E. 244, where
an engineer was held to be responsible
to a third person for a failure to comply
with the requirements of the blow-post

cause Osborne v. Morgan is cited in the
opinion but there is extensive quotation
from Clark & Skyles, Law of Agency.
This text advocates the third point of
view.
21.
703.

See 2 Clark & Skyles, sees. 594 ff.
(1910) 231 Mo. 176, 132 S. W.

law.
19.
1062.

20.

(1907)

201 Mo.

424, 99 S. W.

This seems to be so not only be-

22. It is interesting to compare this
decision with Steinhauser v. Sproul,

supra.
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was not,n asserting that if he was negligent in failing to inspect the

elevator, or if he inspected it negligently, he was guilty only of nonfeasance for which he would not be liable to plaintiff. Bond, J., (the third
judge) thought that Young should be liable to plaintiff for "ordering
him" to use an elevator, the unfit condition of which he might have known
by ordinary diligence. Thus it is that there is a difference in the result
Two
depending upon the thing upon which attention is concentrated.

judges thought of the inspection and came to one conclusion; the other
judge thought of the order that was given and came to another' conclusion.

Furthermore, there would seem to be a difficulty in justifying the majority
opinion on the basis of the reasoning in Orcutt v. Century Bldg., Co.,
supra.

In Carson v. Quinn' the defendant, as agent of the owner of residence
property, had a hole dug in a court for a trap to a sewer. Then granitoid
was laid over the entire court except this hole. Plaintiff, a tenant, stepped
into the hole which (according to plaintiff) had been left uncovered by
defendant who had entire charge of the premises. Plaintiff had verdict
which was affirmed. The St. Louis Court of Appeals quoted from Osborne v. Morgan, supra, and other opinions but finally stated:
"In these circumstances, the omission to cover the hole was not
mere nonfeasance but a violation of the duty defendant owed the
plaintiff and other tenants; it was a positive wrong for which he
(Italics supplied.)
is liable."
It is submitted that the germ of the true doctrine is contained in this
quotation. Instead of attempting to apply some magical formula or rule
of thumb why not hold ourselves to the question whether the defendant
even though an agent or servant owed a duty to the plaintiff. This question will be answered by the application of general principles of the law
of torts. No formula will solve the problem just as there is no way of
knowing whether anybody else owes a duty except by a study of the law
as it has been developed for centuries of Anglo-Saxon civilization. Such
a method of administering justice at least has vitality and adaptability to
changing conditions. It is believed that this is the correct way of explaining Schmidt v. Rowse,' and Zweigardt v. Birdseye.'
If this broad proposition is accepted does it not seem wholly undesirable to hold that an engineer for a railroad owes no duty to a traveller
to ring a bell? There must be something wrong with a rule of law that
holds that he does not.
23. O'NeiJ v. Young (1894) 58 Mo.
App. 628.
24. (1907) 127 Mo. App. 525, 105 S.

W. 1088.
25. (1889) 35 Mo. App. 288.
26. (1894) 67 Mo. App. 462.
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Whether the broad proposition above suggested be accepted or not,
the latest known rulings of the Kansas City Court of Appeals seem to
be a strict application of an arbitrary rule of thumb contrary to the views
of Mechem and Clark and Skyles,"7 and, it is submitted, certain opinions
by Missouri courts.

C. E.
27. For other comments see 3 Col. L.
R. 116, 9 Harv. L. R. 356, 16 Harv. L.
R. 301.

CURTIS'

28. Student, School of Law, University of Missouri.

